THE FRAGMENTS OF EURIPIDES’ OEDIPUS
ONCE AGAIN: NEGLECTED
EVIDENCE AND LESSONS LEARNED

ABSTRACT: Taking its cue from two recent articles on Euripides’ Oedipus (Liapis 2014, Finglass 2017), this paper addresses neglected evidence on fragments attributed to that play and reconsiders the question of their authenticity. A distinct dichotomy emerges between, on the one hand, fragments transmitted in authors relying on florilegia and, on the other, fragments ultimately deriving from non-florilegic sources. While the latter are above suspicion, there is reason to doubt the authenticity of the former. The paper also argues that there was no cross-pollination between the transmission of the authentic and the spurious Oedipus in antiquity, and that the latter’s readership was limited to milieus with links to rhetoric and education. Finally, the paper offers some general remarks which should be of consequence not only for the fragments of Euripides’ Oedipus, but also for the study of fragmentary Greek tragedies in general.

Euripides’ Oedipus is an unlikely subject of scholarly controversy: its surviving fragments are relatively few, and the scholarly attention they have received is rather scant compared with some of Euripides’ other fragmentary plays. Still, the last few years saw the publication of two lengthy papers, which have held diametrically opposed views with regard to the authenticity of many of the play’s fragments. In Liapis 2014 (henceforth: VL), I argued that most of the Oedipus fragments that have come down to us as quotations are spurious, while in his response Finglass 2017 (henceforth: PJF) sought to demonstrate that the case against authenticity does not hold water.

* I am grateful to an anonymous Logeion reader for helpful comments. All remaining errors are mine.
Whatever the merits of our respective contributions, it seems to me that both Finglass and I have left a number of important questions unanswered, and that our arguments are sometimes open to objections or, at least, to different approaches. Although the present paper does, rather inevitably, contain correctives to both VL and PJF, its purpose is not polemical. On the contrary, by eclectically building on arguments presented in VL and PJF, I propose to revisit the language and content of some of the fragments, discuss neglected evidence with a bearing on the authenticity question, and address broader issues with which scholars working on fragmentary Greek dramas are faced.

1. HOW GENEROUS ARE THE PAPYRUS GODS? RE-EXAMINING THE TRANSMISSION OF THE OEDIPUS FRAGMENTS

In my 2014 paper, I argued that both the papyrus fragments of Euripides’ *Oedipus* and the few quotation-fragments that have also turned up (in whatever degree of completeness) in papyri are authentic. On the other hand, I maintained, the bulk of quotation-fragments from Stobaeus, Clement, and others are in all likelihood spurious and may originate in a late rhetorical exercise. This dichotomy may appear too schematic, and has understandably raised Finglass’s eyebrows:

The papyrus gods have apparently given us enough papyri to confirm the authenticity of all the genuine quotation fragments. They have not left any genuine quotation fragment without a helpful confirmatory papyrus; nor have they confused the issue by providing any papyrus of the putative rhetorical exercise which Liapis regards as the origin of all the other quotation fragments. Generous gods indeed, we might think. Is this really plausible?

Finglass makes a valid point. Although in my 2014 paper I did detail the source(s) through which each of the *Oedipus* fragments has reached us, I failed to categorize them in meaningful groups, thereby leaving a critical vulnerability in my argument, which Finglass duly identifies:

It is not a matter of papyrus fragments versus quotation fragments, as might be inferred from Liapis’s statement “papyrus fragments and quotation-fragments

1. PJF 4–5.
are not compatible as parts of a coherent plot — a fact which, surprisingly, has gone largely unnoticed so far” [VL 308]. Rather, it is a case of, on the one hand, papyrus fragments and those quotation fragments which happen to coincide with them, and on the other hand, all the other quotation fragments.2

I admit that, rather than lumping the Oedipus fragments together under the far too general rubrics of “quotation fragments” and “papyrus fragments”, I should have offered a more nuanced classification of their provenance. Finnegan goes some way towards rectifying this fault; as will be seen below, one can go even further.3 In the present section, I shall classify the majority of the Oedipus fragments (excepting those attested only on papyrus) according to their provenance, attempt to identify the sources from which they may ultimately derive, and then utilize the results of this investigation as a means of gaining new insights into the authenticity question.

We shall begin our investigation with the following Table 1, which contains only quotation-fragments, purportedly from Euripides’ Oedipus, which have not also turned up on papyrus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1: Quotation-fragments that do not overlap with papyri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRAGMENT NO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. PJF 3 n. 10.
3. PJF 4 gives a table listing quotation-fragments (including those overlapping with papyrus fragments), with information on quoting author, attribution etc. As will be seen in the following pages, PJF’s tabular presentation of the evidence can lead to further necessary and useful conclusions, in addition to those PJF himself has drawn.
4. There can be no doubt that Euripidean scholiast’s ἐν δὲ τῷ Οἰδίπου refers to the Euripidean Oedipus.
As can be seen from the table above, the great majority of the quotation fragments that do not overlap with papyri are attested either only in Stobaeus (544, 547–554, *555), or in Stobaeus and one or more other authors (542, 543, 545, 546, 554a). There are two exceptions, namely frr. 541 and 545a, which are solely attested in the scholia to Euripides’ *Phoenissae* and in Clement of Alexandria, respectively. In the following paragraphs, it will be argued that almost all the authors listed in Table 1 are likely to have derived their putative *Oedipus* fragments from florilegia, or gnomologia, or rhetorical treatises, or other texts of this sort rather than from a complete text of the play. This will be shown to have important consequences for the authenticity question.

As has been established by recent research, Stobaeus’ quotations of Euripidean fragments derive from earlier florilegia rather than from first-hand knowledge of the playscripts themselves.\(^6\) Two of the putative *Oedipus* fragments transmitted in Stobaeus are also found in sources whose dependence on earlier florilegic sources seems virtually certain. The first of these fragments is 543, whose first line is also transmitted as *Mon.* 506 Pernigotti in [Menander’s] *Monostichoi* — a collection of maxims in several redactions,

---

5. Clement’s “tragedy” (ἡ τραγῳδία) is likely to be shorthand for “Euripides”; cf. Van den Hoek (1996) 231.

6. See Piccione (1994), esp. 178–88, 197–205. She shows that Stobaeus’ sources draw partly on an Alexandrian “Euripidean thesaurus”, in which plays were alphabetically arranged, and partly on anthologies arranged according to thematic headings or other criteria. Cf. also Piccione (2003), esp. 249–50.
which draw on earlier gnomologic material.⁷ The second fragment is 554a, whose line 4 is also transmitted in the so-called “Theosophia Tubingensis” (§86). The “Theosophia” was probably written in 502/3 C.E., and its author is therefore unlikely to have had access to the complete text of Euripides’ Oedipus;⁸ there can be little doubt that his source for the line was a florilegium or a similar sort of text.

With regard to fragment 545a (on which see pp. 220–223 below), it seems virtually certain that Clement, our only source for it, lifted it from a florilegium rather than from a fully extant text of the play. As has been demonstrated by Stephanopoulos (2012: 109–10), Clement must have been unaware of the fragment’s broader context. This can be deduced from the fact that he applies to Jocasta the words φίλανδρον μετὰ σεμνότητος . . . γυναῖκα, “a wife who loves her husband with propriety”.⁹ It is practically inconceivable that Clement would have used such terms if he had known that the fragment came from Oedipus and that, therefore, the speaker of these lines was a woman who had committed incest with her own son. There can be little doubt that Clement quotes these lines from a florilegium listing edifying aphorisms by author’s name only (in this case, Εὐριπίδου), without any further indication of their provenance.

A more complex case is that of fr. 542, which I print below in the form in which it appears in Kannicht’s TrGF 5.1 (p. 575). The apparatus criticus is based on Kannicht, with some input from Haffner (2001: 121 fr. 21).¹⁰

οὔτοι νόμισμα λευκὸς ἄργυρος μόνον
καὶ χρυσὸς ἑστιν, ἀλλὰ κἀρετή βροτοῖς
νόμισμα κεῖται πᾶσιν, ἤ χρήσθαι χρεών.


---

7. For the hypothetical gnomologic sources from which the Monostichoi arguably derive see Gödler (1963) 119–47.
The fragment is fully transmitted in two florilegia: that of Stobaeus, who attributes it to Euripides’ *Oedipus*, and that of “Orion”, with considerable textual variants. The first two lines are also quoted by Philodemus (in essentially the same form as in Stobaeus, but with attribution merely to “Euripides”) and by Clement, with some divergences from the Stobaeus/Philodemus text, and with attribution to “Sophocles”. The “Orion” version — which, in fact, is attested in the so-called *Appendix Euripidea*, probably a later addition to Orion’s *Florilegium* — preserves textual variants significant enough to suggest that it derives from a branch of the tradition appreciably different from that represented by Stobaeus and company. But there is no doubt that the “Orion” version too derives from a florilegic source, as is suggested by the evidently thematic arrangement of the *Appendix Euripidea*, even though explicit subject headings are lacking. The two appreciably different variants in which the fragment survives — one in Stobaeus/Philodemus/Clement, the other in “Orion” — suggest that it enjoyed wide circulation as a florilegium quotation: variation is one of the fundamental mechanisms whereby gnomic material is expanded and multiplied, often in the context of rhetorical education.

Finally, Clement’s attribution of the fragment to “Sophocles”, although conceivably a mere slip, is perhaps more convincingly explained as a reflection of its erroneous ascription in a florilegium used by Clement as a source. Florilegia are precisely the kind of text in which such misattributions are likely to, and most frequently do occur.

As the preceding discussion has shown, all the sources for fr. 542, save Philodemus, can be shown, with reasonable probability, to rely on florilegic collections rather than on a complete text of the play. What about Philodemus, then? What sort of text was he quoting from? Could it have been a complete text of Euripides’ *Oedipus*? Before attempting to answer these questions, we need to examine the context of the Philodemus quotation,

---

12. Cf. esp. οὗτοι βροτοῖσι κέρδος δέχομαι μόνος | […] ἀλλὰ χ’ ἡ ἀρετὴ μέγα | νόμισμα κτλ.
13. See principally Haffner (2001) 20: “Der Anhang [i.e., the *Appendix Euripidea*] ist eindeutig gnomologischer Provenienz, da er Sentenzen enthält, die zwar keine Kapitelüberschriften und Lemmata aufweisen, die aber aus verschiedenen, nur bruchstückhaft überlieferten Tragödien stammen und die sich blockweise verschiedenen Kapiteln eines Florilegiums zuordnen lassen”. Cf. also Piccione (2003) 258: “…una struttura inequivocabilmente gnomologica, esplicitata da un implicito procedere per capita…”.
which comes from an unidentifiable section of his On Rhetoric (P.Herc. 1669 cols. xxvi, 39–40 – xxvii, 1–21). The passage that is of interest to us was re-edited a couple of decades ago by Tiziana Di Matteo, whose version I quote below with two exceptions.16 The translation is mine.

But [seeing that?] happiness is not something that results from personal opinion [ … ] by Zeus, but for confirmation that a truth conventionally acknowledged17 is more advantageous than a truth that does not persuade, it is worthwhile to give credence to Euripides when he says: “I tell you, bright silver is not the only currency, but virtue [is a sort of currency] too for mankind”. At any rate, people obtain many things by means of their upright-ness, as if by money. But how could a philosopher, himself in possession of proof, pay heed to Euripides, who does not even offer any proof at all?18

16. See Di Matteo (2000) 201–3; for an earlier edition see Sudhaus (1892) 262–3. I differ from Di Matteo (i) in not including her hypothetical supplements in col. xxvii 1 and (ii) in interpreting the $H$ between χρησιμότερον and κατὰ νόμον in col. xxvii 3–4 as a feminine article (ἡ) rather than as a comparative particle (ἡ); cf. Schwartz ap. Schneide- win (1905) 60 n. 14 (the $H$ is absent from Sudhaus’s edition, but Di Matteo reports it as being attested both in the papyrus and in its apographs). The comparative does not seem to make sense, and Di Matteo’s (2000: 203) translation of her text involves a degree of misconstruction: “poiché — dal momento che la verità non persuade — è cosa più utile che moralmente degna credere in Euripide che afferma” etc. However, it is highly doubtful that κατὰ νόμον ἄξιον can mean “(cosa) moralmente degna”. In addition, τῆς μὴ πειθούσης ἀληθείας cannot be the genitive absolute Di Matteo evidently thinks it is (cf. her “dal momento che la verità non persuade”): if it were, the Greek would have τῆς ἀληθείας μὴ πειθούσης. The only way of making sense of τῆς μὴ πειθούσης ἀληθείας is by taking it as genitive of comparison from χρησιμότερον.

17. For ἡ κατὰ νόμον (sc. ἀλήθεια) = “received opinion”, “conventional wisdom” cf. Schneide- win (1905) 60 (“virtutem, in usu hominum quae valet”) and Mayer (1907–1911) 558 n. 151 (“ἡ κατὰ νόμον ἀλήθεια = δόξα”).

18. I take issue here with Di Matteo’s (2002: 203) translation of πίστεις: it is not “credibilità” but “proof”, as suggested by εἰσφέροντι.
How did Euripides intend with this statement to establish what they claim? In which way is it inferred, from the fact that virtue may have a use comparable to money, that more … [the rest of the papyrus is too lacunose for a meaningful translation]

As several scholars have pointed out,¹⁹ the Philodemus passage is a piece of polemic intended to refute claims (presumably by contemporary orators, sophists, and the like) to the effect that conventional ideas about virtue, especially when bolstered by effective rhetoric,²⁰ are “more advantageous” (χρησιμώτερον) than deeper and genuinely philosophical conceptions of virtue, which however lack the instant, if specious, persuasiveness of popular wisdom (τῆς μὴ πειθούσης ἀληθείας).²¹ And it is quite clear that the “Euripidean” fragment cited by Philodemus had been adduced by his unnamed opponents as supporting evidence for their claims — which Philodemus refers to by ὅ φασι (col. xxvii 15) — about the superiority of conventional concepts of virtue.²² The technical language employed by Philodemus suggests that his opponents had used the “Euripidean” fragment as part of an attempt at formal proof (hence Philodemus’ κατασκευάζειν), with a view to reaching a logically cogent conclusion (hence συνάγεται).²³ It follows, then, that Philodemus’ source for the fragment was in all likelihood a rhetorical or sophistic manual, or a text of that sort, rather than a complete playscript.

²⁰. Cf. P.Herc. 1669 col. xxvi 31–5: … πλέον ὑφελὴ[σα] τὴν ὄψιν τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς πείθει πλέον ὠφελῆ σα[ι] τὴν ῥητορικὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὡς εἰσὶν καλοὶ κἀγαθοί, “(sophists are quite wrong to argue) that rhetoric is of greater benefit (than philosophy) because its practitioners can persuade others that they are fine people”. My translation, including the conjectural supplements, follows Schneidewin (1905) 58.
²¹. Cf. Schneidewin (1905) 60 with n. 16 for an explanation of τῆς μὴ πειθούσης ἀληθείας (which he translates “veritate, qua non persuadetur”) as “vera virtute”.
²². Note how the term Philodemus uses to describe conventional conceptions of virtue, ἡ κατὰ νόμον ἀλήθεια, is etymologically akin to νόμισμα, that is, to the word employed as a metaphor for virtue in the “Euripidean” fragment cited immediately afterwards. Cf. Mayer (1907–1911) 558: “unsere Tugendbegriffe sind konventionelle νομίσματα und wie mit den wirklichen νομίσματα kaufen wir uns mit unserer Tugend das Wohlergehen, auf das es alleinig ankommt”.
²³. For those terms’ technical meanings in logic and rhetoric see LSJ, s.vv. κατασκευάζω 8; συνάγω, II.3. The use of poetic quotations as illustrative examples in rhetorical treatises is a well-documented practice, attested already in Aristotle’s Rhetoric; cf., among numerous examples, Ar. Rhet. 1365a13–15 (II. 9.592–4), 1371a28 (Eur. Or. 234), 1371b33–4 (Eur. fr. 184 Kn.), etc.
It is also highly likely that, in Philodemus’ source, the “Euripidean” fragment was quoted in isolation, or with very little context. This is suggested by Philodemus’ remarks that Euripides “does not even offer any proof at all” (μηδὲ πίστιν εἰσφέροντι) for the parallelism he proposes between virtue and money, and that it is not at all clear how Euripides had intended to “establish” (κατασκευάζειν) the claims attributed to him by Philodemus’ unnamed rhetoricians.24 Although Philodemus did, of course, have first-hand knowledge of Euripides, of whose style and dramatic technique he offers several evaluations in On Poems,25 in this particular case he appears to have allowed himself to rely on an indirect testimony, which he evidently did not, or could not, check against the original text. This is no reflection either to Philodemus’ literary sensibility or to his knowledge of Euripides, which far surpassed ours. Unlike modern scholars, Philodemus did not possess the reference tools that would have allowed him to check a purportedly Euripidean reference he had found in a manual. His failure to do so is all the more excusable since he was not concerned with proving or disproving the authenticity of the putative Euripidean fragment, but rather with refuting its content (see also the next paragraph).

If Philodemus’ source for fr. 542 was, in fact, some rhetorical or sophist treatise or handbook, rather than a complete text of Euripides’ Oedipus, then Finglass’ argument about the value of the Philodemus passage as evidence for the fragment’s authenticity is greatly weakened. Specifically, Finglass (PJF 5) thought it inconceivable that a scholar of Philodemus’ extraordinary learning should have failed to detect the fragment’s spuriousness, or that of the entire play for that matter, the more so since Euripides’ genuine Oedipus will have been still in circulation at the time. However, as we have just seen, Philodemus probably did not cull the passage out of a complete play-text but found it in an indirect witness such as a rhetorical manual or some comparable text, which preserved only the short excerpt he quotes, or not much more than that. What is more, in view of Philodemus’ polemical intent, one may safely surmise that it was a matter of relative indifference to him whether the fragment in question was genuinely Euripidean or not: his main concern was to show that his opponents’ use of the fragment

24. Another Euripidean line (an undisputably genuine one, this time) which is cited in isolation by later authors and turned into an object of rhetorical argumentation with no regard for its original context is μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκό (Orestes 234), which is quoted by Arist. Rh. 1371a25–31, Com. Adesp. fr. 839 K.–A., and (implicitly) Pl. Lg. 797d. For the line’s original context see Willink (1986) on E. Or. 233–4. Cf. Liapis (2007) 272.
as “proof” for their claims was logically faulty. So, Philodemus’ testimony cannot, in and of itself, be taken as evidence of the fragment’s authenticity.

Incidentally, if, as seems likely, Philodemus encountered fr. 542 in a rhetorical manual (vel sim.), this might lend some indirect support to the hypothesis formulated in my 2014 paper that the spurious Oedipus to which I believe fr. 542 belonged started life as a rhetorical exercise.26 If the spurious Oedipus was in fact, a rhetorical exercise masquerading as a piece of tragedy, then it was likely to be recycled within the milieu in which it originated: the school of rhetoric.

To sum up the discussion so far, we have seen that all but two of the quotation-fragments of Euripides’ Oedipus that do not overlap with papyrus fragments are transmitted in sources which probably depend on florilegia rather than on a complete text of the play. The two exceptions are fr. 541, which is quoted in the scholia to Euripides’ Phoenissae, and fr. 542, which (as we saw above) Philodemus probably found in a rhetorical treatise or handbook. The former fragment will be treated in detail below (pp. 211–214); as for the latter, we shall have further things to say about it on pp. 214–215.

A second category of Oedipus fragments includes quotation-fragments that have also turned up in papyri, sometimes accompanied by their context.27 The obvious question that arises here is whether the fragments of this second category can be shown to depend on florilegia or comparable sources, or whether they may ultimately derive either from a complete text of Euripides’ Oedipus or, at least, from non-florilegic sources. It is the provenance of this second group of fragments that I propose to examine now, beginning with a tabulation of the relevant material.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRAGMENT NO. (KANNICHT)</th>
<th>PAPYRUS TRANSMITTING THE FRAGMENT</th>
<th>AUTHOR QUOTING (PART OF) THE FRAGMENT</th>
<th>FRAGMENT ATTRIBUTED TO EURIPIDES?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>539a</td>
<td>P.Oxy. 2455 fr. 4, 40–2</td>
<td>Plutarch</td>
<td>Only pap. ([O]δίσιονζ, [οὗ ἀρχή])</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


27. As will be seen below, fragments 554b and 556 are special cases, in that they have turned up as quotations in texts which are themselves transmitted on papyrus.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Authors and Line References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>540</td>
<td>P.Oxy. 2459 fr. 1</td>
<td>Aelian (only lines 2–3), Erotian (only line 2), Athenaeus (only line 2), Plutarch ( \text{ap. Stob. (only lines 7–9)} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>554b</td>
<td>P.Bodm. 25</td>
<td>— ( \text{Yes, with play title (see Kannicht’s app. font.)} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>556</td>
<td>P.Oxy. 2536 col. I 28-30 (Theon’s commentary on Pindar)</td>
<td>Hesychius ( \alpha 1500 ) (only the word ( \alphaηδόνα ) from line 2) ( \text{Both Theon and Hsch., with play title} )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the following paragraphs, I shall attempt to identify the sources likely to have been used by the authors quoting these fragments. Although this exercise cannot yield unassailable results, it will appear that, on balance, the authors in question are more likely than not to have relied on sources other than florilegia.

To begin with one of the more complicated cases, fr. 539a is the opening line of Euripides’ \textit{Oedipus} \( \Phiοίβου ποτ’ οὐκ ἐῶντος τέκνον \), which is twice quoted by Plutarch as a \textit{bon mot} supposedly used by Cicero (with \( \tauέκνον \) strategically changed into \( \tauέκνα \)) to satirize the ugliness of Voconius’ three daughters.\(^{28}\) It is impossible to establish whether the one-liner was actually uttered by Cicero, or whether the anecdote was invented by Plutarch (or his source). But this is relatively unimportant. What matters more is how Cicero, or Plutarch (or his source), came by the opening line of Euripides’ \textit{Oedipus}. While access to a complete text of Euripides’ \textit{Oedipus} cannot be excluded, it is equally likely, or even likelier, that Cicero’s and/or Plutarch’s knowledge of the line came from a secondary source, a later text quoting the incipit of the play or a more extended portion of its prologue. Could this secondary source have been a florilegium? The question must probably be answered in the negative. The syntactically incomplete \textit{incipit} could hardly have been quoted on its own in a florilegium; and florilegic quotation of a larger portion of the prologue is only slightly likelier, since the factual background information typically offered in Euripidean prologues makes them

\(^{28}\) Plutarch quotes the fragment in his \textit{Life of Cicero} (27.4) and in \textit{Sayings of Kings and Commanders} (\textit{Mor.} 205c). Even if the latter work is spurious, the anecdote is undoubtedly Plutarchean: it is reported in essentially the same language (and with the Euripidean line quoted in exactly the same form) in both passages.
unsuitable either as pièces morales or as aesthetically remarkable pieces of literature. A likelier possibility is that Cicero’s and/or Plutarch’s knowledge of the incipit of Euripides’ Oedipus came from a narrative hypothesis to the play (a sort of “reader’s digest”, to use Van Rossum-Steenbeek’s felicitous sobriquet), which would have included, among other things, the play’s first line (ἀρχή). Such “reader’s digests” represent the end-point of a process going back, in all likelihood, to a single collection of compendia written by a single author, perhaps a Peripatetic or Alexandrian scholar, who undoubtedly had access to the complete texts of the plays he was summarizing. In other words, Cicero’s and/or Plutarch’s source for Oedipus’ opening line was unlikely to have come into contact with the florilegic tradition.

An equally complicated case is that of fragment 540, the second line of which, or a little more (vv. 2–3 ὀὐρὰν δ’ ὑπίλασ’ ὑπὸ λεοντόπουν βάσιν | καθέζετ’), is attested in Aelian, Erotian, and Athenaeus. To begin with Athenaeus, his change of ὑπίλασ’ into ὑπίλας to suit a humorous reference to the bearing of a male character bespeaks, no doubt, a certain familiarity with the text, but it is impossible to ascertain whether such familiarity stems from first-hand knowledge of the play or from, say, an anthology. Things look a little more promising when we turn to Erotian’s lexicon of Hippocratic glossai. The lexicon is known to rely on an earlier, now-lost lexicon by Bacchius of Tanagra, as well as on scholarship on literary texts, including literary glossaries and scholia. There is nothing to suggest that the sources mined by Erotian included florilegia of the kind utilized, as we saw above,

---

29. As far as I can see, with help from Piccione 1994, Stobaeus quotes from Euripidean prologues very rarely, and then almost never from the earlier portion of the prologue. The relevant cases I have been able to identify are E. Andr. 85, 94–5 (=Stob. IV.32.159, 162, pp. 554.14–15, 555.4–6 Wachsmuth/Hense) and Med. 54–5 (=Stob. IV.29.37, p. 428.14–16 W/H). The only major exception I can find is the quotation of Med. 13–15 in Stob. IV.33.30 (p. 580.8–11 W/H). This is not to say, of course, that at least some of Plutarch’s numerous tragic quotations cannot have been derived from florilegia: see Mitchell (1968) 176, 181, 188, 189, 190. On the difficulty of ascertaining the extent of Plutarch’s use of miscellanies of excerpts as opposed to the original texts see Morgan (2011), esp. 64–6, 67–8. As for Cicero’s quotations from Greek tragedy, it is possible that he encountered many of them in his philosophical sources rather than in the tragic texts themselves: see Jocelyn 1973.

30. For one among many examples of such “reader’s digests” see P. Oxy. 2455, which contains parts an alphabetic list of Euripidean plays, with each item accompanied by play title, first line (ἀρχή) and narrative summary. See further Van Rossum-Steenbeek (1998) 20–1, 208–9; cf. PJF 2 with n. 5.


by Stobaeus or Clement. Finally, with regard to Aelian, it is hard to establish, as a rule, whether he draws his material directly from the authorities he cites, or whether he relies on secondary sources.\(^{33}\) In the specific case of fr. 540.2, however, there is some evidence (admittedly, indirect and inconclusive), which suggests that Aelian may have used a complete play-text, or at least a compilation of extended passages — at any rate, not an anthology of short tragic excerpts. The fragment, which describes the way the Sphinx curled her tail beneath her leonine legs, is quoted in the context of Aelian’s discussion of mythic perceptions of the lion. In the same context, Aelian also quotes Empedocles and Epimenides, which suggests that he had access to the original texts, or at least to compilations of substantial excerpts; for it seems unlikely in the extreme that a florilegium should have brought together authors as disparate as those three with the unlikely theme of lions as the connecting link.\(^{34}\)

As for fragment 554b (\(\times — \sim \tilde{o} \; \text{πόλισμα} \; \text{Κεκροπίας} \; \chiθονός \; | \; \tilde{o} \; \text{ταναός} \; \text{αἰθήρ}, \; \tilde{o} \sim — \times — \sim —\)), it is by far the earliest quotation of Euripides’ Oedipus, embedded as a piece of mild paratragedy in Menander’s Samia (325–6), with Κεκροπίας having possibly replaced an original Καδμείας.\(^{35}\) There can be little doubt that Menander was familiar with Oedipus in its entirety, either through a copy of the script or through a recent revival of the play in Athens.

Finally, fragment 556 comes from a scholarly commentary on Pindar’s Pythian 12, and it is a safe assumption that the commentator, the 1st-century B.C.E. grammarian Theon, son of Artemidorus of Tarsus, either worked directly from a complete copy of the play or at the very least relied on serious earlier scholarship — at any rate, not on florilegic excerpts.\(^{36}\) As for Hesychius, he will have relied, for his entry ἀηδόνα, on earlier lexicographic works (mainly Diogenianus, with supplements from other sources).\(^{37}\)

\(^{33}\) See Johnson (1997) 21–2, 29 with reference to Aelian’s quoting habits in the Varia Historia (though not in the De natura animalium in which fr. 540 is quoted).

\(^{34}\) As an alternative possibility, it is conceivable that Aelian’s source was an alphabetic anthology, in which excerpts from Empedocles, Epimenides and Euripides would have appeared in close succession. But it is highly unlikely that the alphabetic vicinity of those excerpts should have coincided with their thematic affinity, and on a subject as abstruse as mythic lions at that.

\(^{35}\) See the literature cited in VL (315 n. 32) and add now Sommerstein (2013) ad loc.


It follows from the preceding survey that the four fragments listed in Table 2 above are quoted by authors who will have had direct access either to Euripides’ *Oedipus* itself (certainly Menander, probably Theon, perhaps Aelian) or to serious scholarship on the play (Erotian, Hesychius, perhaps Aelian); the latter possibility seems to be the likelier one for Plutarch’s report of Cicero’s parodic quotation of fr. 539a. There is nothing to suggest that any of these quoting authors relied on florilegia for their text of *Oedipus*. In principle, then, they may be safely considered as relatively reliable witnesses for the genuine *Oedipus* — considerably more reliable, at any rate, than anthologists or authors drawing on anthologies. Even if these quotations had not, by a lucky fluke, also turned up in papyri, as they have, the testimony of the aforementioned quoting authors should have been considered dependable because the sources they probably drew on seem unlikely to have been contaminated by the vagaries commonly affecting the reliability of florilegia (interpolations, false attributions, and suchlike).

The combined evidence of Tables 1 and 2 above, together with the preceding discussion of the sources of the respective fragments, establishes a fairly clear dichotomy. The putative *Oedipus* fragments transmitted in florilegia, or in authors who may have relied on florilegia (Table 1), comprise a considerable number of fragments — at least nine — whose authenticity comes under suspicion, as I shall argue in detail below (section 2). By contrast, all of the quotation-fragments in Table 2 are transmitted in authors who appear to have drawn on sources other than florilegia or the like; these are among the fragments whose authenticity is above suspicion, as I argued in VL 309–16. The fact that fragments from the latter group have also turned up in papyri provides welcome confirmation of their authenticity, but is otherwise only a happy coincidence, and certainly not attributable to the “benevolent gods” of papyrology. Finglass’s amusing but misleading quip (PJF 3–4) obscures the fact that the fragments listed in Table 2 above represent a branch of the tradition that is demonstrably independent of and uncontaminated by the florilegia or the florilegia-derived quotations that constitute the bulk of the quotation-fragments of *Oedipus*. In consequence, PJF’s (3 n. 10) corrective quoted on p. 2 above is in need of further refinement. For what we have here is not really “a case of, on the one hand, papyrus fragments and those quotation fragments which happen to coincide with them, and on the other hand, all the other quotation fragments.” Rather, it is a case of, on the one hand, papyrus fragments and those quotation-fragments which derive from non-florilegic texts or scholarship, and
on the other hand, quotation-fragments found in florilegia or in authors arguably relying on florilegia. This important distinction between florilegic and non-florilegic transmission has obvious consequences for the reliability and, ultimately, for the authenticity of the Oedipus fragments, as will be seen later in this paper (see esp. section 3).

2. AUTHENTICATING EURIPIDES’ OEDIPUS (I): DEMONSTRABLY SPURIOUS FRAGMENTS IN THE FLORILEGIC TRADITION

The present section will offer a re-examination of a number of putative Oedipus fragments whose authenticity was impugned by me in my 2014 paper and defended by Finglass in his 2017 response. I shall limit myself to nine fragments, all of which can be shown to be both florilegic and spurious. My arguments for athetesis are often different from those I offered in my 2014 paper, and frequently arise from Finglass’s criticisms.

I begin with fr. 541, one of the two quotation-fragments listed in Table 1 as not being obviously derived from a florilegium. The translations of the Oedipus fragments cited throughout this section are those I used in Liapis 2014 (occasionally with minor divergences).

2.1 Fr. 541

Λαίου Θεραπων
Ἡμεῖς δὲ Πολύβου παῖδ’ ἐρείσαντες πέδωι
ἐξομματοῦμεν καὶ διόλλυμεν κόρας

SERVANT OF LAIUS
Pressing Polybus’s son firmly to the ground we blind him and destroy the pupils of his eyes.

38. These remarks apply also to Prodi (2017: 29 n. 13), who attributes to me the “quite extraordinary” view that a spurious, inferior Oedipus “managed to displace Euripides’ tragedy in the entirety of the non-papyrological tradition — but not in any of the papyri”. Again, the distinction between the papyrological and the non-papyrological is misleading: the real dividing line is between the florilegic and the non-florilegic (the latter category also happens to include papyrological finds).
A version of the story in which Oedipus was blinded by Laius’ servants would represent a striking deviation from the known tragic or mythic variants — a deviation perhaps not unworthy of Euripides. But is such a version credible? In VL (316–24), I argued that a group of slaves attacking and maiming their own sovereign could never have been part of a fifth-century tragedy. In response, PJF (11) suggested that Oedipus may have been, at that point in the play, a mere private citizen, not the king of Thebes, since “he is referred to merely as the son of Polybus.” But the patronymic does not necessarily mean that Oedipus was a private citizen, since monarchs too can be addressed as “son of so-and-so”; for instance, Eteocles is “son of Oedipus” (Aesch. Sept. 203, 677 Οἰδίπου τέκος), and Pelasgos is “son of Palaechthon” (Aesch. Supp. 348 Παλαίχθονος τέκος). What is more, assuming that Oedipus was not a ruling king when attacked by Laius’ servants creates more difficulties than it solves, since it entails one of the following improbable scenarios:

(i) If the blinding happened before Oedipus solved the Sphinx’s riddle, it is unthinkable that Oedipus, now a penalised criminal, was subsequently allowed to confront the Sphinx and save the city — as he certainly did in Euripides’ genuine Oedipus (cf. frr. 540, 540a) — rather than being expelled or subjected to further, even more severe punishment.

(ii) If the blinding happened after Oedipus had solved the riddle, then we are asked to accept not only that the man who delivered Thebes from the Sphinx was subsequently disfigured by servants but also that Jocasta was expected to marry (or had already married) a penalised, maimed criminal (frr. 543, 545, 545a, 546 and others imply that Oedipus and Jocasta are married).

(iii) Whether the blinding happened before or after Oedipus’ and Jocasta’s marriage, it is scarcely credible that the queen dowager would be expected to wed, or to remain wedded to (as she insists on doing in fr. 545a), the very man who had murdered her previous husband.

Against the authenticity of fr. 541, there is also the important linguistic argument (which I invoked already in VL 322–3) that ἐξομματοῦμεν must

39. PJF’s argument is based on a suggestion made to him by Martin Cropp per litteras.
40. For the scenarios cf. already VL 319.
41. Admittedly, there is nothing either in fr. 541 or in its source (the MAB scholia to Eur. Phoen. 61) to suggest that the reason for Oedipus’ enforced blinding was his murder of Laius. This, however, is the only plausible scenario: why else would Laius’ servants want to blind Oedipus?
mean, in this context, “we put his eyes out”, a sense unparalleled in the fifth century, and quite possibly in pre-Hellenistic literature in general.42 In classical Greek, ἐκ in compound verbs never denotes the annulment or invalidation of the action expressed by the simplex; rather, it merely intensifies the simplex. Even the one potential exception I identified in VL (323) turns out, upon closer inspection, to be specious. The Hippocratic ἐκχυμόω (De morbis 2.47, VII.68 Littré σίδια δημέα ἐκχυμώσας καὶ νυκλάμνων) does not mean “to extract juice from”, as I thought, but “to turn into pulp”, probably by boiling, since one cannot “extract juice from” pomegranate peels or cyclamen. In addition, in my 2014 paper I failed to mention that the simplex χυμοῦσαι means “to be converted into χυμός” (LSJ s.v.), which means that ἐκχυμώω is simply an intensified form of χυμόω, like all other ἐκ-compounds in classical Greek. In other words, my case against the likelihood of ἐξομματοῦμεν meaning “we put his eyes out” in the fifth century is actually stronger than I had originally made it out to be.43 The fragment in question cannot possibly be Euripidean, and in view of the unparalleled sense of ἐξομματοῦμεν, it is probably to be dated to Hellenistic or post-Hellenistic times.44

Having bolstered my case against the authenticity of fr. 541, I should now point out, in fairness, that one of the relevant arguments I used in my 2014 paper does not hold water. In VL 323–4, I maintained that the pleonasm in ἐξομματοῦμεν καὶ διόλλυμεν κόρας is otiose and evidence of poor style. But this is simply wrong: the pleonasm serves to drive home an important point (cf. PJF 12), as it does in, e.g., Aesch. Pers. 299 Ξέρξης μὲν αὐτὸς ζῆι τε καὶ φάος βλέπει; Eur. Alc. 20–1 τῇδε γάρ σφ’ ἐν ἡμέραι | θανεῖν πέπρωται καὶ μεταστῆναι βίου; Phoen. 361 οὕτω δ’ ἐτάρβησ’ ἐς φόβον τ’ ἀφι-χόμην; Ba. 617 οὔτ’ ἔθιγεν οὔθ’ ἥψαθ’ ἡμῶν.45

42. Cf. also Prodi (2017) 29 n. 13: “the strange use of the prefix ἐξ- in ἐξομματόω in fr. 541 does warrant some suspicion”.

43. Note that the Hippocratic passage which I (misguidedly) pointed to as a potential exception was latched on (equally misguidedly) by PJF 12 as an argument for accepting that ἐξομματόω could mean “to blind” even in Euripides’ time: “There has to be a first instance in extant literature somewhere, and such an instance might well have been in Euripides; Liapis cites a text with such a sense from the fourth or third century, and as such the semantics do not require us to posit the existence of a much later work.”

44. It has been put to me that ἐξομματοῦμεν may mean “we open(ed) his eyes”: on this assumption, the servants would have prised open Oedipus’ eyes, which he would have instinctively tried to keep shut for protection. However, in classical Greek ἐξομματόω never means “to open one’s closed eyes”; its sole attested meaning is “to restore someone’s eyesight”, a sense patently unsuitable to the context of fr. 541.

45. Cf. also the passages cited in VL 334 n. 107. Comparable examples may be found, unsurprisingly, outside of Greek literature as well: e.g., Chaucer, The Knight’s Tale Pt. II,
As I have already pointed out, fr. 541 (which, we recall, is transmitted in the scholia to Eur. Phoen. 61) is the one item in Table 1 that does not obviously derive from the florilegic tradition. It is, however, within the limits of probability that the fragment originally came from a source already contaminated by an ancestor of the florilegic tradition which has preserved spurious Oedipus fragments; conceivably, the sensationalism of Oedipus’ being blinded by servants was enough to ensure the fragment’s inclusion in some sort of anthology. The composite commentary on Euripides compiled by Didymus of Alexandria will have been concluded around the end of the first century B.C.E., although significant additions to the old scholia may have been made until the mid-third century C.E. This is compatible with the time-frame within which the spurious Oedipus is likely to have entered circulation — no doubt sometime before the first century B.C.E., the terminus ante quem being the lifetime of Philodemus of Gadara (ca. 110–ca. 30 B.C.E.), who quotes fr. 542.1–2, as we have seen.

2.2 Fr. 542

For the text of the fragment, its variants, and details on its transmission see p. 201–206 above. The main problem with this fragment (cf. VL 325–6) is its rhetorically feeble, indeed seemingly pointless, equation of virtue with coinage, the tertium comparationis being apparently the assumption that both of them are potentially available to all people. Specifically, the fragment claims that “virtue too” (2 κἀρετή), as well as silver and gold (1–2 οὔτοι … ἄργυρος μόνον | καὶ χρυσός), is a form of currency, which is “established for all humankind” (3 νόμισμα κεῖται πᾶσιν). But the logic here is hopelessly muddy. What is the point of equating virtue with silver and gold coinage?

1365 “And solitarie he was and evere alone”; Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream 5.1.218–19 “The … mouse … | May now perchance both quake and tremble here”.
48. For the force of καί in κἀρετή see VL 325, with the welcome correctives offered by PJF 13. For the force of οὔτοι … μόνον see PJF 13 n. 23, citing one of his anonymous readers. Another of Finglass’s anonymous readers (PJF 13) objects that πᾶσιν in line 3 need mean no more than “in the eyes of all people” rather than “available to all people” as I paraphrased it in VL 325. Even if this is so, I do not see how the resulting sense is very different: either way, the fragment claims that all humankind has (or believes it has) the opportunity to choose to be virtuous; in both cases, the conclusion is that people should practice virtue (ἵνα χρῆσθαι χρεών), just as they use coins.
The author might have stated, more persuasively, that virtue is superior to silver and gold, or at least he might have pointed out that virtue cannot be bought by money — as indeed Euripides states elsewhere.\textsuperscript{49} Or he might have envisaged virtue as a kind of treasure that encompasses the value of all material treasures — perhaps something along the lines of the Elder Zosima’s statement, in Dostoyevsky’s \textit{The Brothers Karamazov}, that “Love is such a priceless treasure that one may purchase the whole world with it, and redeem not only one’s own but other people’s sins too”.\textsuperscript{50} However, all that fr. 542 says is merely that virtue, like silver and gold, is available to all people, and that all people should therefore practice virtue (cf. \textit{ἧι χρῆσθαι χρεών}), just as they use silver and gold coins. Now, moralizing statements are often platitudinous, but the astounding inanity of this fragment is hard to match. Apart from the obvious unsoundness of its premise (gold and silver are not available to all people), the fragment is a rhetorically feeble and unnecessarily roundabout way of saying that people should be virtuous.

\textbf{2.3 Fr. 543}

\textit{ΟΙΔΙΠΟΥΣ (?)}

\begin{quote}
\textit{Μεγάλη τυραννὶς ἀνδρὶ τέκνα καὶ γυνὴ}

\[\begin{array}{c}
\text{* * *}
\end{array}\]

\textit{ἴσην γὰρ ἀνδρὶ συμφορὰν εἶναι λέγω}

\textit{τέκνων θ' ἁμαρτεῖν καὶ πάτρας καὶ χρημάτων}

\textit{ἀλόχου τε κεδνῆς, ὡς μόνον τῶν χρημάτων}

\[\begin{array}{c}
\text{* * *}
\end{array}\]

\textit{ἡ κρεῖσσον ἐστιν ἀνδρὶ, σώφρον' ἣν λάβῃ.}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{49} See VL 325 n. 74 for evidence.

\textsuperscript{50} See \textit{The Brothers Karamazov} (Братья Карамазовы) Book II, ch. 3: “Любовь такое бесценное сокровище, что на нее весь мир купить можешь, и не только свои, но и чужие грехи еще выкупишь.” PJF (13) argued that fr. 542 is not equating virtue with money, but rather describing the relationship as one of “equality when superiority might be more naturally expected”; the only piece of evidence PJF cites is the Septuagint version of \textit{Song of Solomon} 8.6 κραταιὰ ὡς θάνατος ἁγάτη, σκληρὸς ὡς ἀδῆς ζῆλος. However, what we have in the Biblical passage is not a relationship expressed in terms of “equality when superiority might be more naturally expected”, but a relationship of equality pure and simple: the point is, precisely, that love is just as powerful as death, the most powerful thing imaginable.
(OEDIPUS?)

Children and a wife are a great rulership for a man <text missing?> For it is, I say, an equal misfortune for a man to lose children, fatherland and money, as (to lose) a good wife, since possessions alone <text missing?> or (what?) is better for a man, if he gets a virtuous (wife).

As I pointed out in VL 328–9, what line 1 offers is not a comparison but an equation: it does not say “wife and children are as valuable as a great τυραννίς” but “wife and children are a great τυραννίς”. In other words, it uses τυραννίς as a metaphor to signify a valuable or desirable possession. However, such a metaphorical use of τυραννίς appears to be unparalleled both in Euripides and in classical Greek literature in general. And if τυραννίς is not a metaphor, then the line must mean, absurdly, that through wife and children one can literally exercise actual despotic power.51

It is possible that the lack of evidence for the metaphorical use of τυραννίς in classical Greek is merely accidental. Or it may be that Euripides simply chose to deviate from established usage in this particular instance. Still, the facts on the ground remain obstinately fixed: it has been impossible so far to locate classical parallels for the metaphorical use of τυραννίς (or of τυραννος for that matter). One of Finglass’s anonymous readers (cited in PJF 14 n. 24) adduces three passages as alleged instances of such a metaphorical use: Eur. Hipp. 538, Hec. 816, and Plato, Resp. 573b. But upon closer inspection the parallels turn out to be specious. In the Republic passage, the context of the discussion, which revolves around the genesis of the τυραννικὸς ἄνηρ and his evil desires (ἔρως), makes it clear that Eros is actually envisaged as a literal tyrant (and tyrant-maker). Likewise, in the Hippolytus passage, Eros is τύραννον ἀνδρῶν because he literally holds tyrannical sway

51. Arguing that the fragment’s lost context may have made clear the rationale behind equating family life and despotic power, Finglass (PJF 14–15) adduced as a parallel Il. 12.243 εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος, ἀμύνεθαι περὶ πάτρης, which he argued might seem to mean, if taken out of context, that fighting for one’s country “is” an omen (rather than, e.g., a response to an omen or an action undertaken to fulfil an omen). But Finglass’s parallel is misleading. Whereas the “Euripidean” fragment equates two things, the Iliadic passage does not: it merely states that, of all possible omens, the best is to fight for one’s country — and this is evident whether one takes account of its context or not. The Iliadic passage might have been an adequate parallel to the “Euripidean” fragment, if the latter stated that, of all possible kinds of τυραννίς, the greatest is to have a wife and children. In that case, of course, μεγίστη rather than μεγάλη τυραννίς would have been required, just as the Iliadic passage has ἄριστος rather than ἀγαθός.
over his subjects (cf. also Eur. fr. 136.1 σὺ δ’ ὦ θεῶν τύραννε κἀνθρώπων Ἔρως), just as, say, Zeus the τύραννος does in *Prometheus Bound*.\(^{52}\) In all these cases, the qualities of a literal τύραννος are attributed to deities or personified quasi-divine entities (including Peitho in the *Hecuba* passage), who are invested, in the Greek mind, with the attributes of an absolute ruler. We may choose to call this a metaphor, but for the Greeks there was nothing metaphorical about the power of such superhuman beings.

But perhaps the most serious objection to the authenticity of fr. 543 is that its emphatic mention of (presumably) Oedipus’ wife and children is incompatible with the indisputably genuine frs. 540 and 540a, in which Oedipus has only recently defeated the Sphinx, and therefore must still be possibly unwed and certainly childless.\(^{53}\) Since frs. 540 and 540a contain a detailed and ornate (almost ekphrastic) description of the Sphinx, including a quotation of her riddle, they must point to relatively recent events; for Greek tragic narrative seems to avoid such florid “ekphrastic” detail in describing persons or objects pertaining to the distant past.\(^{54}\) And if in the genuine *Oedipus* the Sphinx episode was a very recent one (though probably not part of the play’s action), then fr. 543, which implies that Oedipus has children by Jocasta, cannot have been part of the same play.

### 2.4 Fr. 545

*(ΙΟΚΑΣΤΗ?)*

πᾶσα γὰρ δούλη πέφυκεν ἀνδρὸς ἡ σώφρων γυνή·
ἡ δὲ μὴ σώφρων ἀνοίαι τὸν ξυνόθ' ὑπεφρονεῖ

*(ΙΟΚΑΣΤΑ?)*

Every sensible wife is her husband’s slave; any who is not sensible looks down upon her partner out of folly.

---

52. Zeus as τύραννος: *PV* 222, 310, 736, 942; Zeus’ τυρανις: *PV* 10, 305, 357, 756, 909, 996.
53. For the argument see VL 332–3, contested by PJF 16.
54. For the argument see VL 311–12. NB that “ekphrastic” passages such as those of frs. 540 and 540a are not the same thing as detailed and elaborate accounts of past events, which of course abound in Greek tragedy — e.g. in Soph. *OT* 774–833 or *Trach.* 555–81, for which see Dingel (1970) 93 n. 21; Di Gregorio (1980) 59–62; cf. also VL 311–12 n. 19, where however Eur. *Ion* 859–922 (esp. 887–96) and *Phoen.* 103–201 are erroneously labelled “ekphrastic”. As far as I can see, the only tragic passage that offers something akin to ekphrasis in reference to past events is Eur. *El.* 452–78 (cited by PJF 12 n. 22). However, this passage is lyric, whereas frs. 540 and 540a come from an iambic narrative.
Although it is true that, as PJF 16 remarks, “we do not know who spoke these lines, or in what context”, it is obvious that whoever spoke them meant to offer them as a model of female married conduct. Whoever s/he is, the speaker of these lines has done a singularly bad job of commending his or her idea of wifely duty. As I pointed out in VL 333–4, δούλη is the wrong word in this context, since it evokes, in the fifth century B.C.E., a relationship of hateful and reprehensible subjugation. Such a relationship is alien to Greek ideas of wifely duty, for all the emphasis on female submission we often find in Greek texts.\(^55\) Moreover, as Stephanopoulos notes, the highly charged δούλη is out of tune with the dispassionate and factual manner in which a woman’s spousal obligations are described in the fragment.\(^56\)

One may profitably contrast such passages as Eur. fr. 129a Kn., which offers a sharp distinction between a wife and a slave-woman or handmaid; Aesch. Supp. 335, where δμωΐς is used in connection with a woman’s status in an extremely loathsome marriage; and Eur. Med. 232–4, in which Medea, in a shrewd bid to win over the chorus of ordinary women, paints married life in the bleakest possible shades by stating that married women merely purchase, with their dowry, “a master for their bodies” (δεσπότην τε σώματος).\(^57\) Especially in the last two passages, the possibility of being enslaved to one’s spouse is excoriated as an abomination, not as part of a wife’s normal duties.\(^58\)

---

55. A number of tragic passages do stress that a wife must comply with her husband’s wishes: see, e.g., Eur. El. 1052–4, Andr. 213–14 (quoted in VL 335) and, more mildly, Tre. 655–6. But in none of these passages is the relationship envisaged in terms of servitude (δουλεία).

56. See Stephanopoulos (2012) 114, who also notes that requiring a wife to be her husband’s δούλη would seem to be well-nigh unthinkable in the 5th century (“eine beispiellose Übertreibung, die für das 5. Jahrhundert nahezu undenkbar scheint”).

57. The two former passages are cited in VL 333–4; the third passage is cited by one of Finglass’s anonymous readers (PJF 16 n. 26). On the Medea passage see further Mastronarde (2002) ad 230–51.

58. My argument is not affected by such passages as Eur. Supp. 361–2 τοῖς τεκοῦσι γὰρ | δύστηνος δόστις μὴ ἀντιδουλεύει τέκνων, or Or. 221 ἵδον· τὸ δούλευμ’ ἠδόν. Although the wording in these passages is indeed strong (see Willink [1986] on Or. 221–2), neither instance is comparable to the δούλη of fr. 545. In both passages, the speakers (Theseus in Su., Electra in Or.) use δουλευ- not as a description of their regular status but as a means of stressing that they exceptionally, if wholeheartedly, accept to perform specific menial duties (helping an elderly woman walk, nursing a sick person), which would normally be reserved for slaves. This is very different from Theseus or Electra describing themselves as δοῦλοι tout court. Contrast Eur. Ion 109–11, 120–4, 128–33, where Ion’s repeated declarations of servitude (111 θεραπεύω, 124 λατρεύων τὸ κατ’ ἦμαρ, 129 λατρεύω, 132 δοῦλαν χέρ’ ἤχεων) reflect his status as, literally, Apollo’s servant; similar vocabulary is used
This irregularity represents such a fundamental departure from even the most extreme manifestations of fifth-century Athenian patriarchy that it suffices, in and of itself, to cast the gravest doubt over the authenticity of this fragment. But there is further evidence to warrant suspicion. As has been pointed out by both Stephanopoulos and myself, the fragment’s language bespeaks a basic ineptitude in the use of the article. In line 1, the unarticled ἀνδρός is an odd bedfellow for the articulated γυνή. The article with γυνή makes it clear that a specific kind of wife is envisaged — ἡ σώφρων γυνή, the “sensible” wife, who accepts to be her husband’s slave. The reference to a specific kind of wife ought to have been matched by a reference to a specific kind of husband, which likewise should have been signalled by the article (τάνδρος).

This is not of course to say that an unarticled ἀνδρός is amiss per se, only that the article used to lend specificity to γυνή would require another article to lend specificity to ἀνδρός — as indeed happens in Eur. El. 931 ὁ τῆς γυναικός, ὁ ἄνδρος ἡ γυνή, 936-7 ἐπίσημα γὰρ γῆμαντι καὶ μείζω λέγη | τάνδρος μὲν οὐδείς, τῶν δὲ θηλείων λόγος, and Ar. Thesm. 803 τῆς τε γυναικός καὶ τάνδρος τοῦν έκάστου (in the last case, the articulated nouns indicate women and men as general categories, “Athenian males” vs. “Athenian females”). When examined in this light, the parallels adduced by PJF (17) to justify the lack of article in ἀνδρός — namely, Eur. Ἁρ. 665–6, El. 1072–3 and fr. 546.1 — turn out to be specious. In the two former passages, there is no article either in γυναικός / γυνή or in ἀνδρός, whereas in the present fragment γυνή is articulated but ἀνδρός, incongruously, is not. The third passage adduced by PJF begs the question, since fr. 546 is among the suspect fragments of Euripides’ Oedipus.

Again in line 1, πᾶσα ... ἡ σώφρων γυνή is unidiomatic: one should expect either πᾶσα σώφρων γυνή or ἡ σώφρων γυνή (with generalizing article). What is more, πᾶς “quisque” with the article is prosaic, and almost never found in serious poetry.

in Plut. Mor. 405c ἡ νῦν τῷ θεῷ λατρεύουσα (of the Pythia) and 407d–e θητοῖς ὑπηρέταις, θεῷ λατρεύοντες (of the Delphic officials); see Gibert (2019) ad 121–4, 128–40, 132–3.


61. Cf. VL 343–3 and p. 223 below.

62. Cf. Ellendt and Genthe (182) 608: “Cum [πᾶς] significat quisque, i.e. omne secundum singulas sui partes consideratum, articuli patiens non esse constat”.

Even on the extremely rare occasions in which πᾶς + article occurs in serious poetry, it is always followed only by an adjective or adjectival participle (e.g., ?Aesch. PV 127 πᾶν ... τὸ προσέφησον; Soph.
carpet by translating “The sensible wife is wholly her husband’s slave.” For this meaning to be obtained, an adverb like πάντη or πάντως (“in every respect”) would be required instead of πᾶσα, which is adjectival, even though one may choose to translate it by an English adverb such as “wholly”. Just as, e.g., Thuc. 4.43 ἦν γὰρ τὸ χωρίον πρόσαντες πᾶν means “the entire place was steep”, so in the present fragment πᾶσα ἡ … γυνὴ can only mean that “a woman in her entirety” (rather than “in every respect”) must be her husband’s slave. The fragment’s faulty style, caused by its misuse of the article, produces an absurdity that is as patent as it is irreducible.

Last but not least, as Stephanopoulos (2012: 115–16) has observed, πᾶσα γάρ occurs three times in the Oedipus fragments (545.1, 545a.8, 546.1), but is otherwise unattested in Euripides. This may seem trivial but it is not: it would be utterly remarkable for a locution that is absent from the entire Euripidean corpus to appear with such high frequency in the same play, perhaps even in the same scene. The triple occurrence of this syntagm is quite simply evidence of poor penmanship: πᾶσα γάρ is both a convenient (if bland) way to begin a trochaic line and an easy means of conveying a sense of didactic generalization.

2.5 Fr. 545a

(ΙΟΚΑΣΤΗ)

eὖ λέγειν δ’, ὅταν τι λέξῃς, χρὴ δοκεῖν, κἂν μὴ λέγῃς, κἀκπονεῖν, ἃν τῷ ἐννόντι πρὸς χάριν μέλλῃ ἡ λέγειν.65

* * *

ἡδὺ δ’, ἢν κακὸν πάθηι τι, συσκυθρωπάζειν πόσει ἄλοχον ἐν κοινῷ τε λύπης ἡδονῆς τ’ ἔχειν μέρος

* * *

Aj. 151 πᾶς ὁ κλυών). The combination πᾶς + article + adjective + noun (as in πᾶσα ἡ σώφρων γυνὴ) is exclusively prosaic; cf. Pl. Soph. 219a περὶ τὸ θνητὸν πᾶν σῶμα.

63. Thus PJF 17, adopting a suggestion made to him by Martin Cropp in private communication.


65. For a discussion of various attempts at emending the corrupt λέγειν see Stephanopoulos (2012) 102–3 (cf. VL 337 n. 113).
σοὶ δ’ ἐγώγε καὶ νοσοῦντι συννοσοῦσ’ ἀνέξομαι
καὶ κακῶν τῶν σών ξυνοίσω, κοιδένεν ἔσται μοι πικρόν

* * *

οὐδεμίαν ὤνησε κάλλος εἰς πόσιν ξυνάορον,
ἀρετή δ’ ὤνησε πολλάς· πάσα γὰρ ῥαγὸ ἀγαθή·
ἡτις ἀνδρὶ συντέτηκε, σωφρονεῖν ἐπιστάται.
πρῶτα μὲν γε τοῦθ’ ὑπάρχει: κἂν ἄμορφος ἦι πόσις,
καὶ κακῶν τῶν σῶν ξυνοίσω, κοὐδὲν ἔσται μοι πικρόν

(JOCASTA)
She (sc. a good wife) should think that he (sc. her husband) speaks rightly whenever he says anything, even if he does not; and she should work to achieve whatever is likely to gratify her partner through her words(?). <Text missing?> It is pleasing too, if her husband has some setback, for a wife to put on a sad face with him and to join in sharing his pains and pleasures. <Text missing?> Now that you suffer this affliction, I will endure sharing your affliction with you and help to bear your misfortunes; and nothing will be (too) harsh for me. <Text missing?> Beauty benefits no wedded woman in regard to her husband, but virtue benefits many. For every good(?) wife who has melted in union with her husband knows how to be sensible. Her first principle is this: even if her husband is unhandsome, to a wife with a mind at all he ought to appear handsome; what judges(?) <a man?> is not the eye but the mind.

The fragment’s authenticity was twice assailed in the last decade by Stephanopoulos (2012) and by myself in VL 336–42; but already Denniston’s much earlier censures (“incredibly lame”, “a very lame piece of work”) suggest that he cannot have had much faith in its genuineness. 68 Still, PJF 19, while admitting that he would not “include this fragment in an edition of the

66. For the metrical anomaly entailed in ἀγαθή see Stephanopoulos (2012) 113; VL 340 with n. 129. Both authors maintain that the metrically offensive ἀγαθή is due not to textual corruption but to authorial ineptitude in metrical matters.
67. The line is obviously corrupt; for attempts at emendation see Stephanopoulos (2012) 108–9 (cf. VL 336 n. 109).
68. Denniston (1950) 159 and lxxv n. 1 respectively.
fragments of Euripides’ *Oedipus*”, states confidently that “there is nothing here that could not be by Euripides.”

In point of fact, there is a good deal here that “could not be by Euripides”. To begin with, the repetition of λέγειν (1) is offensive, and paralleled only in comedy, which is precisely where one should expect to find this sort of jingle: cf. Menander, fr. 723 λέγεις, ἃ δὲ λέγεις, ἔνεκα τοῦ λαβεῖν λέγεις; see also the multiple repetition of μαθεῖν and παθεῖν in Sotades fr. 4 K.–A., and the various forms of λοιδορέω in PhiloNeo fr. 23 K.–A.

There is further evidence of untragic style in συσκυθρωπάζειν (3), which is otherwise attested (also in the simplex) only in comedy and in prose. Apart from being untragic, συσκυθρωπάζειν sits oddly in its context, *pace* PJF 18–19, for it signifies a facial expression (“look sullen”, “put on a disconsolate look”) rather than the *emotion* reflected in the expression — namely, the emotion of sympathy a loyal wife should be expected to experience when her husband is in distress. The fragment’s emphasis on facial expression rather than on the emotion associated therewith is bizarre, and it is not made less so by imagining that, for the good wife envisaged here, “looking as unhappy as [her husband] does is step one in showing her sympathy with him”. For if the speaker’s intention is to describe, and prescribe, the full extent of wifely duty, it is pointless for her to stop at “step one” rather than going all the way. Why insist merely on the expression she should put on rather than on how she would genuinely feel if something bad happened to her husband?

Another stylistic inconcinnity is created by εἰς πόσιν (7), even if one accepts that this odd phrase means “with regard to, in her dealings with her husband” (PJF 19) rather than “for the purposes of finding a husband” (VL 339). As I remarked in VL (*l.c.*), “the rest of the fragment (esp. 10–11, κἂν ἄμορφος ἦι πόσις, χρὴ δοκεῖν εὔμορφον εἶναι) makes it clear that what is


70. That the word signifies specifically a sullen facial expression is made clear by, inter alia, its association with frowning or weeping in, e.g. Ar. *Lys*. 7–8 τί συντετάραξα; μὴ σκυθρώσας, ὦ τέκνον. | οὐ γὰρ πρέπει σοι τοξοποιεῖν τὰς ὀφρύς; Plut. *756* ὄφρισ πυθόμενοι ἐκαθισμασάνθ’ ἀμα; Amphis fr. 13.2–3 K.–A. οὐδὲν οἶδα πλῆρ σκυθρωπάζειν μόνον, | ... σεμνῶς ἐπηρκὼς τὰς ὀφρύς; Antiph. fr. 217.2–3 K.–A. συναγαγόντα τὰς ὀφρύς | τοῦτον σκυθρωπάζοντα θ’; Thphr. *Char*. 14.7 σκυθρωπάσας καὶ δακρύσας. See further Stephanopoulos (2012) 103, 116.

71. Martin Cropp’s suggestion as reported by PJF 18.

72. The linguistic oddity was first pointed out by Weil (1889) 336 (cf. VL 339 with n. 126). Cf. Stephanopoulos (2012) 106, who conjectures that this peculiar phrase was inspired by E. *Alc.* 83–5 ἐμοὶ πᾶσι τ’ ἀρίστη | δόξασα γυνὴ | πόσιν εἰς αὐθής γεγενήθαι.
at issue here is the husband’s beauty, not the wife’s”; thus, the emphasis of lines 7–9 on the wife’s beauty turns out to be a clumsy false start.

Finally, there remains the linguistic difficulty of μέν γε (10), which according to Denniston is “probably entirely absent from serious poetry”, but evidently quite at home in this “incredibly lame” fragment, whose inauthenticity it bespeaks. In spite of Denniston’s warning, PJF (19) claims to have found a parallel for μέν γε in Agathon TrGF 39 F 8.1: καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε χρή τέχνηι πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ | ἐμὴν ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη προσγίγνεται. However, Finglass apparently failed to notice that, in the Agathon fragment, γε qualifies not μέν alone but τὰ μέν as a single syntactic unit (cf. the balancing τὰ δὲ at the end of the same line). One might wish to emend γε away (cf. VL 342), but it is probably part and parcel of the fragment’s numerous linguistic oddities.

2.6 Fr. 546

πᾶσα γὰρ ἀνδρὸς κακίων ἄλοχος,
κἂν ὁ κάκιστος
γημη τὴν εὐδοκιμοῦσαν

Every wife is inferior to her husband, even if the most inferior of men marries a woman of high standing.

The anomalous short iota in κακίων (1) is unparalleled in tragedy; in fact, its only attested instance in (allegedly) classical tragedy is the present fragment. This anomaly in and of itself is sufficient cause for suspecting the fragment’s authenticity: whether such a prosodic anomaly was admissible in fourth-century tragedy (as PJF 20 hypothesises) or not, the fact remains that it precludes attribution to Euripides.

2.7 Fr. 547

Although desire is a single thing, its pleasure is not single: some desire what is bad, whereas others what is good.

The logic here is hopelessly muddled. After proclaiming “desire” to be a single phenomenon (ἑνὸς ... ἔρωτος ὄντος), the fragment goes on to introduce a distinction between the oneness of desire and the manifoldness of the pleasures (οὐ μί’ ήδονή) associated with it. The distinction is supported by the observation that “some desire what is good, whereas others what is bad”. However, this observation does not establish the manifoldness of pleasure, as οὐ μί’ ήδονή has led us to expect, but only the manifoldness of ἔρως, as οἱ μὲν ... ἐρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ ... demonstrates — although we have just been told that ἔρως is single rather than manifold.

This bundle of contradictions may result from the author’s botched attempt to reproduce the idea (attested in a sizeable number of passages, many of them from Euripides) that there are two kinds of ἔρως — e.g., one leading to happiness, the other to ruin, or one inspiring carnal, the other spiritual desire. It looks as if the author made a hash of the “two ἔρωτες” motif by introducing a pedantic and pointless distinction between a single kind of desire and a plurality of pleasures produced by it.

2.8 Fr. 553

| 77. For a list of examples see VL 344–5. |
| 78. PJF 20–1 hypothesises that the now-lost continuation of the fragment may have listed the different kinds of pleasure experienced by people who love opposite things; or that it may even have passed some sort of moral judgement on these pleasures. But even if this is so, οἱ μὲν... ἐρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ... remains patently inapposite, as it focuses, incongruously, on the manifoldness of ἔρως (whose singleness has just been pronounced!) rather than on the plurality of ήδονή. |
It is stupid for a man to testify to his own misfortunes in front of everybody; concealing them is wise.

If ἐκμαρτυρεῖν means “to testify as a witness” (the only attested sense of the verb in classical Greek),79 the speaker will be saying that a person should not “bear witness” to his own misfortunes (τὰς αὐτοῦ τύχας). Pace PJJF 24, the misfortunes referred to cannot “have been almost anything, spoken by anyone with reference to anyone”: the τύχαι in question can only be Oedipus’ unwitting crimes (not his self-inflicted blindness, which is no τύχη). For in a play about Oedipus, there is no other male character (ἄνδρα) of whom it could meaningfully be said that he should conceal his own (αὐτοῦ) misfortunes.80

In such a context, the use of ἐκμαρτυρεῖν is problematic. If the intended meaning is that Oedipus should not confess his crimes, then evidently ἐκμαρτυρεῖν, “to bear witness”, must be used as an oddly loose, roundabout and (as far as I can see) unparalleled synonym for ὁμολογεῖν, the vox propria for “confessing” to an offence.81 If, on the other hand, ἐκμαρτυρεῖν retains its stricter, “quasi-legal”82 sense of “testifying as a witness”, this would imply that Oedipus was at some point in the play called upon to testify with regard to his

79. See the detailed discussion in VL 350–2. For the legal senses of ἐκμαρτυρέω (including “to give a deposition outside of court”, as well as “to testify as a witness”) see VL 350 nn. 165, 166.

80. It has been argued by Collard (in Collard, Cropp and Gibert [2004] 131 on 553) that Oedipus’ “misfortunes” may have been “the wounds made in his feet at exposure, or his murderous encounter with Laius, but probably not his identification as parricide” (my italics); as a further alternative, Collard suggests that someone may have objected “to Oedipus’ exhibiting himself after the blinding, now that he is polluted”. None of these alternatives hold water. The wounds in Oedipus’ feet would have been obvious to any onlooker whether Oedipus wanted it or not; in S. OT 1032–6, the Corinthian messenger refers to Oedipus’ maimed feet as something obvious (hence, he says, his appellation “Swellfoot”), and Oedipus himself openly admits that his disfigurement is shameful. As for his “murderous encounter with Laius”, Oedipus would have had no reason to conceal it, unless he knew the victim to be his own father rather than an aggressive stranger who had it coming to himself (cf. S. OT 798–813 and E. Ph. 37–44). Finally, Collard’s third alternative not only rests on the dubious assumption that τύχη is an apposite word to use of Oedipus’ self-inflicted blindness, but also presupposes that Oedipus’ crimes have already been revealed, which would make nonsense of the “quasi-legal” (Collard’s term, cf. n. 82 below) sense of ἐκμαρτυρεῖν (“to testify as a witness” would imply that guilt has not yet been established).

81. Cf., e.g., Eur. fr. 272b Kn. ὁμολογῶ δὲ σε ἀδικεῖν; Ar. Eq. 296 ὁμολογῶ κλέπτειν; Vesp. 1422 ὁμολογῶ γὰρ πατάξαι καὶ βαλεῖν; etc.

past actions, probably as part of investigations into the circumstances of Laius’ death. Since Oedipus would not be able to summon himself as a witness, we must assume that the investigations were being conducted by someone other than Oedipus. This means either that Oedipus was no longer king, or that he was not king yet — otherwise, he would have been in charge of the investigations himself, as he is in Sophocles’ *Oedipus Tyrannus*. Now, if Oedipus was no longer king, this would mean that his crimes had already come to the fore, in which case there would be no point in his “testifying” to his acts, only in his confessing them (which, as we saw, is an act that cannot be properly described as ἐκμαρτυρεῖν). If, on the other hand, Oedipus was not king yet, then there would be no reason for anyone to try to protect a virtual nobody from incriminating himself through his testimony. Neither Jocasta, who cannot have been married to Oedipus at that point, nor anyone else would care whether Oedipus revealed “his own misfortunes in front of everybody” or not.

If ἐκμαρτυρεῖν can, in this context, have neither its classical sense of “testifying” as a witness nor the unparalleled sense of “confessing”, then the only remaining alternative is for it to mean “to affirm publicly”. But this sense is attested only from the second century C.E. onwards, and then only for the middle ἐκμαρτυρεῖσθαι.83 It seems that the problems surrounding ἐκμαρτυρεῖν are unsurmountable and make it extremely hard to attribute this fragment to Euripides.

2.9 Fr. 554a

ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅστις μὴ δίκαιος ὢν ἀνὴρ
βωμὸν προσίζει, τὸν νόμον χαίρειν ἐῶν
πρὸς τὴν δίκην ἄγοιμ’ ἂν οὐ τρέσας θεοὺς;
κακὸν γὰρ ἄνδρα χρὴ κακῶς πάσχειν84 ἂεί.

Any man who, being unrighteous, sits in sanctuary at an altar — I will myself dismiss the law and take (that man) to justice without fear of the gods; for a bad man should always be treated badly.

83. To *POxyHels* 35.25 (dated 151 C.E.), which is the only relevant example I gave in VL 351 with n. 169, I should now add two further late examples in which ἐκμαρτυρεῖσθαι indicates an affirmation before a public official of the validity of a certain transaction — such as the sale of a slave (*POxy* 95.8, dated 129 C.E.), or a private contract (*POxy*. 1208.3, dated 291 C.E.).

84. The “Theosophia Tubingensis” offers πράσσειν, a banalization; see discussion in Carrara (2018) 115–16.
As I argued in detail in VL 352–4, what is morally shocking (and apparently unparalleled) in this fragment is the speaker’s brazen admission that he would be prepared to drag a suppliant away from the altar at which he had sought refuge. This flies in the face of the well-known fact that the Greeks were generally very scrupulous about avoiding direct violence against suppliants— and apparently even more scrupulous about never openly admitting that they were prepared to do violence to suppliants, even as they sometimes did precisely this. At least in Greek tragedy, I can find no example of a character who openly confesses that he is prepared to do violence to suppliants.

3. AUTHENTICATING EURIPIDES’ OEDIPUS (II): SEEMINGLY UNOBJECTIONABLE FRAGMENTS IN THE FLORILEGIC TRADITION

As we saw in the previous section, there are nine quotation-fragments purportedly from Euripides’ Oedipus whose authenticity must fall under suspicion. Having said that, I admit that in my 2014 paper I did go too far in arguing that almost all fragments deriving from the florilegic tradition can be dismissed as defective, in and of themselves, on the basis of their language, style, or content. In that paper (VL 346–8), I myself admitted that I could find no fault, at least in terms of language, with fr. 549 and 550 Kn. And I have now been convinced by Finglass’s arguments that there are five more...
fragments (544, 548, 551, 552, 554) whose authenticity is not easy to assail in terms of their language or content. Thus, I accept that there are at least seven fragments derived from the florilegic tradition which seem to be unexceptionable (544, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, and 554).

What about these seven seemingly unobjectionable fragments? Are they to be held genuine without further ado? The evidence suggests that caution must be exercised. First of all, it is to be noted that the aforementioned seven fragments are transmitted in Stobaeus, who is also either our only source or one of our sources for seven out of nine suspect fragments (542, 543, 545, 546, 547, 553, 554a). In other words, most of the suspect and all of the seemingly unexceptionable fragments come from the same source — which was, evidently, a (Euripidean?) florilegium utilised by Stobaeus. If the potentially genuine fragments had come from an independent branch of the tradition, this might warrant some confidence in their authenticity; but as they come from a source contaminated with at least seven spurious fragments, their authenticity cannot be considered above suspicion. And even regardless of this argument, there is nothing distinctly Euripidean about the seemingly unexceptionable fragments: there are no idiosyncrasies of language or diction, no Euripidean Lieblingswörter, no characteristic quirks of style that might compel us to attribute those fragments to Euripides. The seven seemingly unobjectionable fragments are merely within the bounds of what is acceptable in terms of tragic style: they may well have been penned by any moderately competent, run-of-the-mill versifier. Thus, the burden of proof is on those who wish to assert the authenticity of those fragments rather than on those who contest it.

4. HOW COULD THE SPURIOUS OEDIPUS HAVE GONE UNDETECTED?

In his 2017 paper, Finglass maintained that a spurious Oedipus, with all its imperfections on its head, could never have been mistaken for the real thing at a time “when a text of the real Oedipus by Euripides was in circulation

88. In my 2014 paper (VL 347, 352), I dismissed frs. 544 and 554 on account of their triteness; but triteness, in and of itself, is no valid argument against authenticity (so rightly PJF 8–9). With regard to fr. 548, see PJF 21 for counterarguments against my earlier strictures (VL 345–6). On fr. 551 see PJF 22–3, refuting my criticisms of its alleged stylistic faults (VL 348–9). Finally, with regard to fr. 552, my linguistic objections (VL 349–50) are adequately answered in PJF 23 (with n. 32).
— since if the play was being read at Oxyrhynchus in the fourth century C.E., it was certainly being read in a wide variety of locations in the centuries before that.889 Forestalling an obvious objection, Finglass (PJF 6–7) argues that neither the pseudo-Euripidean Rhesus, which drove its genuine namesake out of the manuscript tradition, nor Prometheus Bound, which was mistaken for the work of Aeschylus, can support the hypothesis that a pseudo-Euripidean Oedipus displaced the genuine play. For one thing, Finglass says, both Prometheus Bound and Rhesus were probably written not long after Aeschylus’ and Euripides’ deaths, at a time when confusion with the genuine articles was easier to occur and to influence manuscript tradition. For another, mistaking the extant Rhesus or Prometheus Bound for the real thing was much easier, because the real thing was not available for comparison; by contrast, such confusion could never have arisen in the case of the spurious Oedipus, which will have “coexisted with the true Euripidean play for centuries” (PJF 7). It seems incredible, Finglass says, that learned readers confronted with the existence of two plays claiming to be Euripides’ Oedipus did not devise, at the very least, a byname to distinguish the namesakes from each other.

Curiously, Finglass fails to mention that the existence of identically titled plays, which apparently circulated along each other for some time, is anything but an unparalleled phenomenon in the history of Greek drama. The ancient catalogue of Aeschylus’ dramas (TrGF 3, T 78 Radt) mentions both an Αἰτναῖαι γνήσιοι and an Αἰτναῖαι νόθοι, which shows that two homonymous tragedies, both claiming to be the work of Aeschylus, had reached Alexandria. The catalogue’s distinction between a genuine and a spurious Women of Aetna may appear, at first sight, to corroborate Finglass’s argument that a similar label should have been used in the case of the two Oedipus plays too. However, the librarians’ tags γνήσιοι and νόθοι appear to have left no traces elsewhere in the tradition, nor were they reflected (as far as we can tell) on the book market. The authors quoting the handful of extant fragments from Women of Aetna simply cite the play’s title — Aetna, or Αἴτναι, or Αἰτναῖαι — without adding anything resembling the distinguishing label desiderated by Finglass. What is of particular interest here is that the Alexandrian scholars obviously retained both the “genuine” and the “spurious” Women of Aetna among the works of Aeschylus. According to a

89. Quotation from PJF 5. The copy “read at Oxyrhynchus in the fourth century C.E.” is P.Oxy. 2459, which has yielded the indisputably genuine fragments 540, 540a and 540b Kannicht.
plausible scenario proposed by Ritchie in a different context, this suggests that the “spurious” Women of Aetna

“may have been a work of some antiquity, which had been erroneously identified as [Aeschylus’] work and had become established as such. In this case it is possible that a spurious work supplanted the genuine one, and that the error was discovered when the genuine play turned up.”

It would appear, then, that even the Alexandrian scholars — people of extraordinary learning, who had read a far greater number of Attic dramas than we ever will — could occasionally be misled into making an erroneous attribution. Apparently, in the case under discussion, they knew from the didascalic records that Aeschylus had produced a tragedy entitled Women of Aetna; and when a spurious play of that title reached the Library, they assumed, mistakenly, that it was the work of Aeschylus. Evidently, then, the case of Women of Aetna demonstrates that, pace Finglass, a genuine and a spurious play of the same title could very well coexist with each other, with the majority of readers remaining unaware of the distinction.

Ancient confusion regarding the correct attribution of plays is not limited to the Women of Aetna. The ancient Life of Euripides (TrGF 5, T 1, 1A.9 Kannicht) says that of the plays attributed to Euripides “three are considered spurious, Tennes, Rhadamanthys, Peirithous” (νοθεύεται τρία, Τέννης Ῥαδάμανθυς Πειρίθους). In the case of Tennes and Rhadamanthys we know nothing further about the nature of the doubt. With regard to Peirithous, we know from Athenaeus (11.496b) that there was some uncertainty regarding its attribution: was it the work of Euripides or of Critias? Moreover, there was similar uncertainty concerning Sisyphus, a play which ancient sources attribute now to Critias, now to Euripides. We know that Euripides did write a satyric Sisyphus (as the last play of a different tetralogy, which comprised Alexander, Palamedes and Trojan Women), and it would appear that in this case at least the confusion went back to the didascaliae themselves, i.e. back to a time when both Critias’ and Euripides’

90. Ritchie (1964) 23.
92. See Snell and Kannicht’s app. font. to TrGF 1, 43 F 19.1, 33, 35.
93. See TrGF 1, DID C14.
plays were still available.\footnote{\textsuperscript{94}} Apparently, no distinguishing byname was ever devised for any of these plays, despite Finglass’s postulate.

In view of the examples cited above, Finglass’s argument that two plays simultaneously in circulation could not be confused with each other is perhaps not as “overwhelming” (PJF 7) as he claims. We must be wary of projecting — as I think Finglass unwittingly does — modern book-market conditions onto antiquity. That a reader in Egypt could still read, in the fourth century C.E., the genuine Oedipus by Euripides does not necessarily mean that readers elsewhere had access to the same text. Finglass’s assertion that the pseudo-Euripidean Oedipus would be exposed as spurious at an era when the genuine play was still available disregards a crucial fact: such a comparison between the genuine and the spurious play could only be made by the very few people who had access to both texts. Most of these people would work at large libraries, where a concerted and systematic effort was made to collect copies of every extant work. But even expert scholars with access to large libraries were liable to commit the occasional gaffe, as the case of Women of Aetna demonstrates. If expert ancient scholars could sometimes be mistaken about the authenticity of this or that work, then a fortiori an average reader (and here we must surely include most excerptors and anthologists) cannot have been expected to be able to identify the pseudo-Euripidean Oedipus as spurious.

Indeed, it would have been all the easier for the spurious Oedipus to escape detection if, as I argued in VL 356–65, it started life in the milieu of rhetorical education. In such a case, the spurious play’s readership will conceivably not have extended far beyond a relatively small circle comprising teachers and students of rhetoric, authors of rhetorical works,\footnote{\textsuperscript{95}} scholars and commentators,\footnote{\textsuperscript{96}} and of course anthologists. This humble rhetorical exercise, which was probably not a full-fledged play (cf. VL 357),\footnote{\textsuperscript{97}} is extremely

\footnote{\textsuperscript{94}} According to Kannicht (\textit{TrGF} 5, p. 659), the tetralogy consisting of Peirithous, Rhadamanthys, Tennes and Sisyphus was authored by Critias, but for some reason the didascaliae attributed it variably to either author (“in didascaliis incerta de causa inter Critiam et Euripidem fluctuasse”). In Alexandria, the tetralogy was erroneously included in the Euripidean corpus, with Critias’ Sisyphus, rather like the pseudo-Euripidean Rhesus, being erroneously identified as the lost Euripidean play of the same title (“Sisyphus tandem similiter atque Rhesus locum fabulae Euripideae quae ov\textepsilon\zeta\iota\varpi\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron οὐκ ἐσῴζετο occupaverit”).

\footnote{\textsuperscript{95}} Cf. the case of Philodemus above, pp. 202–206.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{96}} Cf. pp. 211–214 above on fr. 541.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{97}} Cf. Stephanopoulos (2012) 119, who conjectures that frr. 545a, 545 and possibly 546 may have originated in a Christian milieu as moralistic pieces revolving around the theme of “the good wife”.

unlikely ever to have reached any of the important libraries, where its inauthenticity would no doubt have been detected and exposed. Thus, it never became part of the mainstream tradition of Euripidean tragedy.

We must conclude that the genuine and the spurious Oedipus followed two different avenues of transmission, and their paths probably never crossed in antiquity. The genuine Oedipus, which was sufficiently well-known in Athens in the 4th century B.C.E. to attract Menandrean paratragedy (see p. 209 above), undoubtedly reached Alexandria, entered the manuscript tradition together with the rest of the Euripidean corpus, and was accessible to readers like the owner of P.Oxy. 2459 in 4th-century C.E. Egypt, and perhaps even to Theon, Aelian, and others. As for the spurious Oedipus, it never entered the mainstream manuscript tradition of the Euripidean corpus. Rather, from its humble beginnings as a rhetorical exercise it gradually took on an only slightly less humble life of its own, eventually managing to pass itself off as Euripides’ Oedipus, though only in milieus with links to rhetoric and education. And given the porous boundaries between rhetoric, education and anthologic activity, it is not hard to explain how material from the spurious Oedipus percolated into the florilegia from which, as we saw, most of the surviving spurious fragments are derived.98

We have thus come back full circle to our fundamental distinction between, on the one hand, fragments deriving from non-florilegic sources and, on the other, quotation-fragments found in florilegia or in authors relying on florilegia (cf. pp. 210–211 with n. 38 above). To repeat, in the case of Oedipus, there was evidently no cross-pollination between these two branches of the tradition — which is why it is misleading to speak, as Prodi does, of “a possibly incomplete, second-rate rhetorical exercise manag[ing] to displace Euripides’ tragedy in the entirety of the non-papyrological tradition”.99 If the spurious Oedipus displaced the genuine article, it was only in florilegia, rhetorical manuals, scholia, and the like.

5. EPILOGUE: SYNOPSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED

This paper has led to a number of conclusions, which I hope will be of some utility not only for the fragments of Euripides’ Oedipus and the ques-

98. For cases of gnomologia absorbing material from the school of rhetoric see Liapis (2007) 280–91.
ition of their authenticity, but also for the study of fragmentary Greek tragedies in general. I summarize these conclusions below.

1. *Two independent lines of transmission.* In section 1, a survey of the sources which transmit the (not exclusively papyric) *Oedipus* fragments showed that the tradition bifurcates into two apparently independent branches. On the one hand, there are quotation-fragments deriving from non-florilegic texts or scholarship, which also happen to have turned up, independently and often partially, on papyrus. On the other hand, there are quotation-fragments transmitted mostly in florilegia or in authors relying on florilegia; in one case (fr. 542), a fragment transmitted in florilegia is also likely to have circulated in rhetorical manuals; and in another (fr. 541), the fragment’s source is an ancient scholium, for which contamination from the florilegic tradition is not inconceivable.

2. *A critical mass of intractably problematic fragments.* In section 2, we saw that there are at least nine *Oedipus* fragments whose authenticity must remain under suspicion. Almost all of these fragments derive from florilegia or from authors relying on florilegia. The exception is fr. 541, which, however, contains linguistic material that indisputably points to an era considerably later than Euripides’s (see pp. 212–213 above); moreover, its source, as we saw in the previous paragraph, was probably not impervious to contamination with florilegic material.

3. *Transmission is all-important.* In section 3, we saw that even florilegic fragments that seem unobjectionable must be placed under suspicion, since they derive from the same source — a florilegium mined by Stobaeus — as those fragments whose authenticity is demonstrably assailable (see discussion in section 2).

4. *Spurious literature could easily go undetected in antiquity.* In section 4, we saw that it would not have been hard for the spurious *Oedipus* to co-exist with the genuine play without necessarily attracting suspicion — the more so since the spurious work probably had a relatively limited readership (rhetors, commentators, anthologists), was transmitted mainly through florilegia, manuals and related texts, and never became part of the Euripidean corpus. To put it another way, the spurious *Oedipus* did not displace or supplant its genuine namesake: parts of it merely happened to survive through the florilegic tradition, whereas the authentic play stopped circulating sometime after the fourth century B.C.E., without leaving any traces in the known florilegia.
The above findings have broader repercussions for the study of fragmentary plays in general. As we have seen, the bifurcation in the transmission of the *Oedipus* fragments is the result of one branch of the tradition depending on florilegic material and another branch deriving from sources uncontaminated by such material. A plausible way of explaining this bifurcation is by theorizing that the florilegic branch of the tradition derives ultimately from a versified rhetorical exercise, in which an apprentice orator would have offered an innovative variation of the Oedipus myth. This hypothesis is formulated in detail in VL 356–64, where I also point out (358–63) that there is evidence for precisely such a rhetorical exercise in *Trag. adesp.* 665 Kannicht/Snell. This *adespoton*, a loose rewriting of Eur. *Phoen.* 446–637, misled at least one eminent Greek scholar into taking it for “part of an original Greek Tragedy written in (or not much later than) the 4th century B.C.”; however, there can be little doubt that it is the work of a late versifier. Specifically, this text is likely to have been a rhetorical exercise in *ethopoiia*, or “impersonation of character”, in which the apprentice orator dramatized the debate between Eteocles and Polynices over their respective claims to the throne of Thebes, and argued the case for each side in a versified *agon logos* redolent of tragedy (see further VL 361–3). Although this particular exercise did not, as far as we can tell, find its way into the florilegic tradition, similar pieces of versified schoolwork are likely to have been fairly widespread, and the possibility must be entertained that the florilegic tradition of tragic fragments may have been more susceptible to intrusions from this kind of rhetorical hackwork than is generally recognized. In other words, purportedly tragic fragments may have insinuated themselves into florilegia without ever having been part of the regular manuscript tradition of the respective author’s oeuvre.

If it is true that the amount of schoolroom debris that has infiltrated the florilegic tradition of tragic fragments is significantly higher than one usually suspects, then we are in need of diagnostic tools for detecting such intruders. One of the things I have attempted to do in this paper is precisely to identify and utilise some such tools. But this is by no means an easy task, especially when one has no indisputably genuine material (as we do have in the case of Euripides’ *Oedipus*) to use as a control. Still, this is an endeavour that needs to be undertaken, if we are to sieve out the detritus that may be masquerading, in the florilegia, as precious relics from Greek tragedy.

100. Page (1941) 172; cf. VL 360 with n. 181.
REFERENCES CITED


Mitchell, C. S. J. (Sister St Gerard) (1968), An Analysis of Plutarch’s Quotations from Euripides, PhD diss., University of Southern California.


Schneidewin, W. (1905), Studia Philodemia, Göttingen.


Sudhaus, S. (1892), Philodemi volumina rhetorica, Leipzig.


**Open University of Cyprus**

vayos.liapis@ouc.ac.cy